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can actually deepen, and young characters
grow--and the fact that such accommodations
acCClTIllOCldations
can be made is just another indicator of the
comparative triviality of the human interest
in an cmnivorous
omnivorous diet.
But not all such
conflicts are so easily solved.
Lots of
children, for instance, consume p.rescription
];harmaceuticals
];harrnaceuticals at a dizzying rate, and such
drugs are tested on a variety of animals in
But camron
painful and lethal ways.
cOI!lIl'On child
hood ailments--think, for example, of urinary
tract infections--are more t..'lan
t..'1an merely annoy
ing; if left untreated, they can badly damage
very important organs. The arguments against
the use of animals in at least much of scien
tific research and product testing are, to
borrow a phrase of Thoreau's, "many and
weighty and deserve to prevail," but our
children need those drugs.
Should moral
vegetarians abstain also from ill-gotten,
ill-tested
elem61ts
elements of the
];harmacopia?
];harrnacopia?
Should they also deny the benef
its of those
benefits
products to their children?

Etli
This essay, the three
Etlitors
tors I Note:
commentaries
oommentaries on it, and the response to those
commentaries were all presented at the East
ern Division meeting of t..'1e
b'1e Society for the
Study of Ethics and Animals.
With the co
operation of the participants in SSEA meet
ings, we hope that publication of the pro
ceedings of those meetings will be a regular
feature of Between th~ Species.

tions to ot.her people. The decision to adopt
a vegetarian diet, for instance, is sure to
affect
relationships
wiL~
spouses
and
friends, and not simply because the vegetari
an becomes rather more trouble to have to a
dinner party; the deeper problem is that the
moral vegetarian poses by his/her diet an
buplicit critique of L~e morality of the
Duplicit
choices of her fria~s.
If her friends are
of an enquiring turn, the critique may well
become explicit.
The problem here is not
negligible---in fact, it has led one well
~~own moral philosopher to mount what I
call
the
"argument from conviviality" against
becoming a vegetarian[I]--and neither is it
exhausted by considerations of one's friends.
Think of the vegetarian's children.
I f they
are within a certain age, he/she will likely
be imposing his/her moral values upon his/her
kinds in a place where they can actually
taste it.
Apart from t..'leir
t..'1eir gustatory diffi
culties with a diet that is newly restricted,
as well -as
as newly expanded, the children will
face their own version of the conviviality
problem:
they will differ from their peers
at a t.Lme of life when differences Illay
may be
particularly costly.

In medical contexts, the temptation to
sacrifice universal principle in the name of
a particular affection will be extremely
strong, ever so much more than in the case of
diet.
puzzling out what should be done here
Puzzling
is tough and deserves more attention than
philoso];hers concerned with this area of
morality have given it.
In this presenta
tion, I'll be focusing on the rather dramatic
case of xenograft--the transplantation of
tissues or organs from members of one species
. to those of another--where the human stake is
likely to be especially high.
But I will
keep sight of how more common
cOI!lIl'On medical thera
pies also affect animals and of how decisions
about such treatments affect those to whan
whom we
are especially bound.

Showing how partial affections may run
counter to considered moral judgments isn't
to do anything newsworthy; it seems faintly
unprofessional to dwell on the conflict, and
ta:ltamount to a confession of moral we~ess
to suggest that it might ever be resolved in
favor of partiality.
The major moral theor
ies--perhaps particularly those most involved

***
That xe..'1ograft
xa~ograft is at least an
experi
armamentU.'n is well
mental part of medicine's armamentml1
known
kn~ since the tragedy of "Baby Fae." Fae 's
defect-hypoplastic left heart syndrane--has
syndraue--has
killed a lot of children and will go on
killing them unless their hearts can be re
paired or replaced.
As things now stand,
replacement seem~ the most promising m::rle of
treatment.
Yet, trauma deaths in infants
occur seldan,
seldom, and children with HLHS can't
wait.
It's far fran
from clear that xenograft
actually served any of Fae's interests or
that it was even very reasonable to believe
it might.
She may have been as much an

in enhancing the moral status of animals-
have little patience for partiality. And why
should they?
Isn't any insistence on a dis
tinct moral significance for partial affec
tions arbitrary, an invitation to invidious
kinds of discrimination against those we may
not happen to feel fond of?
As ~~
n: happens, the difficulties I've
mentioned can often be handled with no sacri
fice of principle to sentiment--friendships
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experimental animal as Goobers, her donor. [ 2]
But it is perfectly reasonable to think that
interspecies
inter
species transfUantation could came to be
a technique of real value to many otherwise
doomed children, and perhaps adults as well.
The image of infants condemned to death
because of congenital defects is heartbreak
ing and is clearly a strong motivator for the
Plysicians
physicians and other scientists involved in
xenograft research. The compassionate traits
that are involved in the intensity of our
response here are morally valuable, even
though limited in scope-and perhaps they
could not be so valuable were they not so
limited.

;

i
i.j '

,

Perhaps it is considerations like these
which have led writers such as Cora Diamond
and John Benson to be critical of dialectical
crowbars like the "marginal cases argument"
which try to pry us loose of our biases
towards "our own." In Benson's 1978 Philoso---Ply
phy essay, "Duty and the Beast," he writes
that

why Should
should it be thought that impartial moral
reason and special affection for members of
our own species will conflict over xenograft?
As widespread as the partiality for humans
is, the conViction that this preference makes

partiality for our own species is,
like the universe, sanething we had
better accept. • • • The danger in
[an] attempt to eliminate partial
affections is that it may remove
the
source of all
affections.

perfect sense is equally widespread.
In his
recent Rights, Killing and Suffering, R. G.
Frey tries to show how a utilitarian perspec
tive would rank the value of human and of
animal life, respectively:

(1978: 335-6)
Benson's point is apparently a causal
one:
particular affections are a necessary
condition for the developnent of moral behav
ior, and it is perilous for us to becane
disconnected fran that ground.
But although

Some of the things which give life
its richness we share with animals;
there are other things, however,
which can fill our lives but not
theirs.
For example, falling in
love,
marrying and experiencing
with others what life has to offer;
having children and watching and
helping them grow up; working and
experiencing satisfaction in one's
job; listening to music, looking at
pictures, reading books, and so
becoming acquainted with our cul
tural past and present; wondering
where we have cane fran, where we
are going and what explains what
happens around us;
experiencing
htnnan delight and fantasy; making
plans and striving to realize them;
striving to make something of one's
life in terms of one's purposes and
goals; seeking through years of
training and hard work, excellence
in some athletic, artistic or aca-

such claims seem to bear some apparent plaus
ibility, closer examination of authors taking
this line doesn't yield answers to questions
such as, "Even if the first conjunct assert
ing the causal link is true, why should the
second be regarded as true as well?
Why
can't our moral sensibilities expand to more
fully encompass how much of the world is
morally considerable?
And even should both
conjuncts be true, does this mean that all
our
partialities need to be considered:
those for our race as much as those for our
nation, those for our gender as much as those
for our family?
And, in light of the horri
fying expression of some partialities in
human experience, how are we to distinguish
the good from the bad?

a

But perhaps questions such as these are
bit out of fUace in the present context-
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subjective features of
of their lives,
lives, what it
subjective
to be a bat, a dog, a dolfhin.
is "like" to
Mill's test for ranking the quality of exper
iences just isn't open to us here.
Frey's
catalogue, although impartial in its applica
tion, is not impartial in its framing: it is
made up
up of just those things that humans
value.
Frey is what might be called a "se
cond-order" speciesist.

demic endeavour. (1983: 109-10)
This is a catalogue of-what he considers
"greater possibilities of enrich
to be the "greater
ment" characteristic of human life.
Frey
offers it as part of his effort to defend
vivisection,
arguing that well designed,
serious experiments on animals--even if pain
ful or lethal--are justified by their contri
butions to the more richly satisfying lives
The bona fides of this problem,
of humans.
so far as impartiality goes, is revealed by
Frey's application of the criteria.
No spe
ciesist he, Frey is willing to regard human
beings who fail to measure up to normal
standards as candidates for painful, lethal
experimentation as well.

Those who have pushed this point often
seem to regard it as a good thing for
animals.
But it doesn
doesn't
It seem at all that
such a tack is going to support the judgment
that our experiences are "roughly even" in
quality.
It is true, on this assumption,
that it will turn out tllat we have no reason
for holding that our experiences are more
si'J~nificant than those open to animals,
but
significant
neib'1er will we have any reason for thinking
that theirs are equal or greater in signifi
cance than ours. We might end up saying that
"our experience has our kind of value, and
thei,c experience has theirs, II but interspe
thei.c
from interspe
cies tolerance no more follows frOOl
cies relativism than cultural tolerance fol
lows from cultural relativism.

But how impartial is Frey's approach?
from steve Sa
Compare his text to this one frOOl
pontzis:
~

cannot enjoy the life of a dog,
a bird, a bat, or a dolphin. Con
sequently, we cannot appreciate the
subtleties of smell, sight, sound,
and touch which these animals can
apparently appreciate.
Here, we
are the boors. Of course, they, in
turn, apparently cannot appreciate
Michelangelo or Mozart (an insensi
tivity not limited to members of
other species). Here, they are the
boors. This would seem to leave us
roughly even. (1985: 22)

If this is what we are stuck with, then
it seems that there are no good reasons to
lTIOve
ITIOve us off our species partialities. If, on
the contrary, we can make respectable judg
ments about the significance of experiences
across species lines, then it looks as though
"good reasons" actually support those parti
alities.

This text suggests a couple of readings.
the first, we are being reminded of facts
about animals which we know--their superior
sensory abilities, and so forth--but often
overlook in efforts to "impartially" rank the
value of animal and human life.
And it is a
salutary reminder.
But it isn't clear how
taking those factors into account will lead
to a judgment that the value of those lives
is roughly on a par.
It isn I t simply a
matter of operatic genius against olfactory
genius, as Frey's catalogue attests.
It
seems more than plausible that, even granting
the real value and complexity
COOlplexity of the experi
ence of many animals, Frey could still rea
sonably maintain that human experience typic
ally outstrips it, and that vivisection--and
xenograft--are therefore justified from an
impartial, utilitarian perspective.

'!his is not, I think, an especially
surprising
surprlslng result: the upshot of a utilitar
ian approach to the ethics of animal experi
mentation are reformist, rather than revolu
tionary. Exposes like Singer's Animal LiberLiber .
ation document the extent of shoddy
research
shodd~esearch'
in pursuit of trivial goals, and thereby
testify to the abuse of an institution; they
are not a criticism of the institution it
self.
If a utilitarian orientation cannot
categorically reject the experimental use of
animals, it can hardly be expected to show
the immorality of the therapeutic use of
animals.

en

There are a few attempts in the litera
ture to deflect conclusions of this kind.
Lawrence Finsen, for example, has argued that
the use of animals in research is unfair, as
it involves an inecIUitable distribution of
burdens and benefits: the animals do all the

On the second reading, we are being�
being
reminded that there are facts about animals�
animals
which we don't know and can never know--the�
know--the
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suffering; the humans reap all the rewards
(1984) •
This certainly holds for xenograft,
too. Finsen thinks that this lack of distri
butive justice is something that consequen
tialist morality could well be sensitive to,
but I don't believe that this has been shown.
Typical consequentialist approaches to prob
lems about fairness in the distribution of
utilities try to accommodate our intuitions
about justice--since, in
doing so will
increase the utility of accepting and observ
ing the theory. But such intuitions respect
ing animals are simply not shared widely
enough to ground a consequentialistic demand
that \"e observe the tenets of distributive
justice in the design of animal experiments
on therapies.
Our treabnent of animals in
experimental contexts is a "real-life" ver
sion of a standard, textbook refutation of
utilitarianism:
animals are the class whose
"enslave.ment" renders the lives of the rest
of us better off, thus improving the overall
balance between utility and disutility.
A
common utilitarian response to the general
form of this problem--that, given the way the
world really is, such distributions of utili
ties couldn't result in an optimal ratio--is
much more plausible if animals are left out
of the picture. The "slaves" stand still for
it, more or less; the social structure re
mains stable.
And even if it be objected
that current uses of animals in research
certainly do not produce "the greatest good,"
it is reform, not revolution, that can ad
dress this point
point-refonn
-refonn that could well
include directly therapeutic uses of animals,
as in xenograft.

Fae 's donor, was "the experiencing subject of
a life, a life whose quality and duration
mattered to him independently of his 'utili
ty' to us" provides us with a reason not to
sacrifice the interests of Goobers as a means
to anyone else's ends (1984).
This, I think, is a fairly effective
response to the sort of problems that trouble
a utilitarian attempt to forbid xenograft.
For Regan's position doesn't call on us to
say that animal lives are as valuable as our
own; hence, it isn't threatened if they

Part,

should turn out not to be.
The possibility
that the relative value of human and animal
lives may not be measurable is also no
threat.
Regan is simply insisting that Goo
bers' experiences mattered to that animal,
that his life was valuable in his own terms,
whatever those happen to be.
Much about Regan's views is controver
sial--in particular, how he decides conflicts
between human and non-human subjects of a
life.
But I wish to raise a different ques
tion here.
Much of the support Regan clai.ms
for his theory comes from its superiority
over utilitarianism in its handling of intui
tions.
Of course, not just any moral intui
tion will be relevant to the assessment of
competing moral theories; otherwise, Regan's
theory would have a very different tale to
tell concerning animals. Our intuitions must
be run through a series of filters before
they can properly be used to construct and
assess moral theories.
One such test is
lOOled "Impartiality," and here is what Regan
has to say about it:

So, I remain strongly susp~c~ous that a
utilitarian approach will end up supporting
our partialities.
Oddly enough, rejecting
the ranking of animal and human lives as
speciesist will have the same result:

Partiality involves favoring some
one or sanething above others. For
example, if a father is partial to
one of his children, then he will
be inclined to give the favored
child more than he gives his other
children.
In some cases, perhaps,
partiality is a fine thing; but a
partiality
that
excludes
even
thinking about or taking notice of
others is far from what is needed
in an ideal moral judgment. (1983:
128)

Frey's approach to adjudicating con
flicts between humans and other animals in
volves grading the value of the kinds of
experience each has.
A contrasting approach
is to look at animal experience categorical
ly, as does Tom Regan. It is not the content
of animal experiences that is key; the signi
ficant point, rather, is that animals are
subjects of experiences at all, that they are
"subjects of a life" which has value inde
pendently of its value to us.

True, but not very precise.
Regan warns us
here against taking seriously those moral
intuitions which arise from "extreme, unques
tioned partiality." This is fair enough, but
his own theory ends up ruling out expressions
of partiality which are neither.
Parental

Regan spells out the consequences of his
"rights" view for xenograft in a recent Hast
ings Center Report discussion. That Goobers,
BEI'WEEN 'I'HE SPECIES
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The answer to the question, "Is xeno
graft irmoral?,"
irnrroral? ," depends on who is asking.
If the question is put on behalf of parents
struggling to save their child's life, the
answer, as best I can see is "No." A Regan
style account isn't sensitive to the ques
tioner; in categorically rejecting xenograft,
it rejects too much.

partiality need not be a matter of favoring
one child over another; rather, it may be a
question of favoring one's children over
other lIOrally considerable beings--including
animals--who are not one's children.
such
partiality need not be extended in a casual,
unreflective way to gratify relatively trivi
13.1
al desires at the great expense of others; it
may be extended reluctantly, in order to meet
extremely serious interests, because there is
no alternative.
Our children, as I empha
sized earlier, don't need Big Macs or suede
pants.
They often do need medical interven
tions of many kinds--not just xenograft-
which involve using animals as means to their
ends. [3]

But answers that come out of a perspec
tive of species partiality or from
frcrn utilitari
anism are insensitive as well.
They will
endorse xenograft, not merely as an allowable
choice for parents who are suddenly facing
tragic circumstances but in general.
It is
just as permissible a choice for a medical
researcher trying to decide to what project
he/she will devote his/her professional ener
gies.
Such researchers will sacrifice not
one but lIOre likely scores of Goobers as
techniques beccrne refined to the point where
they may be applied, and will possibly press
on to expand the use of xenograft beyond
problems like HLHS to therapies for kidney
failure and for other, less directly life
threatening problems.
The answer to the
research community, then, is that xenograft
is inmoral.
irmIoral.

***
When one thinks about arguing the medts
merits
of a contentious moral issue, such as xeno
graft, the audience for the argument is often
.;>nvisaged
E"nvisaged to be professional gatherings; one
seldcrn thinks of trying to convince the par
ents of a child with HLHS that it would be
wrong for them to avail themselves of the
only means to save their child's life.
Per
haps we restrict our imaginations in this way
because we would expect people so placed to
be altogether beyond the reach of reason, and
could hardly blame them for being so.
But
against this, consider that we expect parents
to be able to make good decisions for their
children in crisis situations--that's just
one of the tough parts of being a good par
ent.
Or perhaps we might say that i f such"
such'
parents did elect xenograft, even if the
decision were, all things considered, immor
humor
13.1,
al, they wouldn't be blameworthy.
But this
suggests that we ought to strive to become
beccrne

The positions of species partiality and
even of utilitarianism are insensitive to
flOrally
m::>rally significant elements; these are not
restricted to sentience alone.
Regan is on
to something, I believe, in claiIning
claiming that
many animals, like many humans, are sources
of value, not merely objects on which we may
place a value. sapontzis, too, is persuasive
when he observes that sane
scrne a..'1imal behavior-
the affection, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and
industry that we associate with them--is of
moral
rooral significance. [4] Along with our shared
sentience, these morally :i.rn.portdnt
important traits are
the COlTlllOn
COlTlllDn property of several species and
call for our respect for non-human as well as
human animals.
But is my position consistent with such
Isn't it just another guise for
respect?
species prejudice, and a prejudice confused
by sentimentality as well'? I think not. the
partiality I endorse is not for our species
but for one's children.
It's the part of a
good parent to single out one's children for
types of consideration which those outside
the relationship do not get. This partiality
may be founded in considerations of interge..r
erational reciprocity; if so, it has scrne
some
points of contact with general conceptions of
justice.
It may be rooted in efficiency in

Barry Kent MacKsy
MacKay

Animal
ADimal Protection Institute
Inatitute (API) 
Canada

the sort of parents who would have the in
'children such a
sight and courage to deny our "children
chance, and I harbor the gravest doubts about
whether such a goal is really an admirable
one.
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satisfying needs and hence closely tied to
considerations of utility.
But I think that
it takes considerable independent supp:>rt
from the moral value of the love that exists
between people whose histories are inter
twined in significant ways.

at stake and the parent's lack of alterna
tives.
ti
ves.
'n1e parent has little real choice if
she is to save his/her child.
He/she could,
I supp:>se, offer his/her own heart, but other
moral and technical considerations apart, who
would take it from him/her? In this respect,
he/she is in a very different p:>sition from
the scientific researcher, who can strive in
rrany ways to save the life of children.

Love of the kind that good. parents bear
their children is itself worthy of our admir
ation.
It is not, however, universalizabie;
I simply can't love everyone as I love my
children. Sane of the reason for this has to
do with the particularity of the shared ex
periences and intimate acquaintance
fran
which such love emerges. But some cOmes from
the nature of parental love.
It is not an
agapeistic love--even with God's grace, one
couldn't extend it to everyone, because it is
essentially a preferential attitude.
It is
good. for children to have scxneone who takes
the trouble to know them intimately, who carl
then appreciate things about them that others
overlook,
over
look, someone who endorses their worth by
singling them out, making them feel special,
making a home for them, loving them "best of
all." They thrive on such love, languish in
its absence.

Second, it isn't altogether clear that
refusing the animal's heart will save him!
her, while it is certain that doing so will
cost the child his/her life.
The animal is
caught in the experimental-therapeutic system
and is probably doomed already. I f he/she is
not a donor for this procedure, he/she will
be for another; if not a donor, then a sub
ject of other experiments.
Against this, it
might be alleged that if an animal isn't
expended on this procedure, it will mean that
one fewer animal ultimately gets used in
experimentation--the next consignment of pri
mates for the labs will include one fewer
than it might have--but there's just enough
looseness here to leave the parent in some
measure of real doubt about whether his/her
decision has actually caused more animals to
be sacrificed.

But even granting the moral worth of
parental partialities,
surely a virtuous
person may not do just anything in the name
of his/her children--not even if he/she is
acting to save their lives.
Why may he/she
sacrifice the life of another creature who is
worthy of moral respect?
It is difficult to
develop a casuistry here. I am not maintain
ing that the kinds of things about children
that evoke parental partiality are justifica
tions for parents' using another subject of a
life as a means to their children's ends.
They don't give us the warrant to develop
therapies which abuse animals.
But I do
think that the parent who finds him/herself
confronting the crisis of the birth of a
child with a defect like HLHS is not just

Third, it is at least plausible that
death is a greater harm to the child than to
the baboon.
The child's death may foreclose
a greater range of satisfaction and preclude
projects of greater moral worth.
Fourth, if the parent chooses to reject
xenograft,
he/she has sacrificed partial
affections altogether to the demands of im
partial reason.
But if he/she accepts xeno
graft, he/she still has a way of shCMing
his/her respect for impartial considerations.
Someone who is both a virtuous parent and
alive to the moral significance of animal
life will push for reform in medical research
and for the replacement of xenograft with
other therapies.
He/she
He/
she will not refuse to
employ available resources if the basic needs
of his/her children are at stake, even though
these resources are paid for with the lives
and comfort of animals.
This he/she may do
in deference to his/her duties as a parent.
But in deference to those general, moral
considerations that include animals in their
scope--his/her concern that the increment of
utility be figured so as to include t.~e plea
sures and pains of animals, his/her respect
for "subjects of a life," even when the life
is non-human, his/her admiration for moral

facing a conflict between a natural sentiment
and a moral principle, so that all that is
required is the courage to resolve it.
He/
she is facing, rather, a moral dilerrma: the
claims of impartial reason and the claims of
parental affection are both morally respect
able.
This still doesn't explain why it is
permissible to resolve this dilemma bY elect
ing to follow one's partial affections.
But
there are a number of considerations which
support such a choice.
First, consider the
fundamental character of the human interests
BEIWEEN THE SPECIES
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partiality's favor.[5]

virtue, even when the virtuous agent is a
member of another species--he/she will work
to obtain the benefits of medical interven
tions in ways that are not damaging to ani
mals.

Notes
1.

This

argument

appears in

Devine's

1978.
Readers of Frey's Rights, Killing and
Suffering will recognize in my description of
the virtuous parent a version of his "con
cerned individual."
As Frey sees it, if
you're convinced of the wrongfulness of cur
rent methods of meat production, you needn't
become a rroral vegetarian.
It is better,
because it's rrore efficient in rectifying
abuses, to become a "concerned individual"
who lobbies against objectionable practices
while still enjoying the benefits of eating
meat.
I think Frey's application of this
notion to the issue of diet is mistaken; he
doesn't even consider the effectiveness of
joining the vegetarian and concerned-indivi
Jo~n~ng
dual strategies and greatly overestimates the
significance of the hUllan
hllllal1 interests involved.
But the interests involved in the preserva
tion of life and the restoration of health
are arrong the most
rrost profound we have.

2. Several short discussions of various
aspects of xenograft appear in the February,
1985, Hastings Center Report, grouped under
the title, "The SUbject Is Baby Fae."

3. Regan discusses the rroral
lOClral signifi
signifi
cance of relationships with loved ones and
friends in section 8.12 of his 1983.
How
ever, it is not clear that cases like xeno
graft would be covered by that discussion:
Regan doesn't explicitly allow
allO\l the appeal to
such
"special considerations" to justify
using otherwise non-threatened subjects of a
life as means to ends solely.
4.

See Sapontzis' 1980.

5. I'm very grateful to Hilde Robinson
for contributions constructive beyond her
usual generous measure. I'm also grateful to
Myron Anderson, John Bahde, David Soyer,
Philip Devine, Alan Soble, Matthias Steup,
a..'1d Stephen Wagner for participating in a
discussion of an earlier draft.

Does any of this refute the charge that
virtuous parent is really just another
speciesist?
Frey's strategy escapes such a
charge, I think; his text implies that if
retarded humans were being factory farmed, he
would find nothing wrong with simply lobbying
to make their treatment more
hUll\3Ile. I'm not
rrore humane.
sure that I want to extend to virtuous par
ents the right to consent to a heart trans
plant for their children if the donors are

my

A CHANGING WORLD
WORLD�
Once people played with wolves
wolves�
leopards.�
And lovers like leopards.
All forest people were almost gods.�
gods.

children with Down's
In another
Down' s Syndrane.
place, I have argued that there is a rrorally
relevant distinction between animals
and
marginal humans:
the marginal humans have
suffered a tragedy in becoming the psycholo
gical equals of animals--a tragedy that ani
mals have escaped.
The sentiments properly
evoked by the recognition of such a tragedy-
pity and compassion--spp.ak
compassion--spp.ak. strongly against
further injury to someone already so afflic
ted (1985).

Once people sang with wolves
wolves�
And lovers like rrorning doves.
doves.�
allOClst are gone.
gone.�
Now all forests alrrost
Once people slept with wolves�
wolves
stare.�
And lovers like winter stare.
All of the gods are almost gone.
gone.�
Alrrost gone are all the wolves
wolves�
The people lovers of the Earth,
Earth,�
And all the gods but one.
one.�

The appeal to the tragedy of marginal
cases can acquit the virtuous parent of the
charge of arbitrary discrimination in choos
ing not to do to a retarded human what he/she
might do to a nonnal baboon.
Still, he/she
is using another as a means to his/her ends.
But i f we grant the moral significance of
parental affections, then the possibility is
open that conflicts between partiality and
impartiality should sanetimes be decided in

The people of the Earth saw God
God�
In all. Now humans see�
see
But one above and not in all.
all.�
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1
into my
palm
should i knit
a universe or a poem?
weave them in my hair
with tiny bows and knots?
tap out a tune?
• • • tra la las
save them in an old shoe box

on
1

"Are
Animals
Moral
Beings?," American Philosophical Quarterly 17
(1980).

(wi th 4-leaf
(with
4-leaf�
clovers and
and�
dusty butter
butter�
flys)?
flys)?�
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cr/ack them like
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marbly kNUcklES?
taste them as chopsticks
thrust into ----DEADANIMALFLESH?
shish kebab!
ponder their pattern
and display them in galleries?
or should i just
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